The concept of crisis, which once had the power to pose unavoidable, harsh and non-negotiable alternatives, has been transformed to fit the uncertainties of whatever might be favored at a given moment. (Koselleck, 2006: 306) C ODE AND CRISIS are made for (and from) each other. The contemporary inflation of digital 'code' into an obligatory passage point for all participation in contemporary life and the ongoing intrusion of crises^financial, ecological, climatic, geopolitical, cultural, psychological into everyday lives are inextricably entwined. Code is in a certain sense the terrain on which decisions concerning chance, pattern, order, values, time, otherness, nature and culture are enacted. 'Crisis' designates a mode of apprehension in which problems of chance, pattern, order, values, time, otherness, nature and culture are posed as dilemmas requiring 'informed' decisions. It is common to view discussions of codes and encodings as rather esoteric and arcane: code is technical; it concerns things rather than people. It is also understandable to feel that so much has already been said about the various crises that currently grip the contemporary world that crisis talk begins to sound like a hangover from certain German philosophies of history. Yet their mutually constitutive relationship remains restlessly active. Code and crisis are rather like the North Atlantic and Great Pacific Garbage Patches: their gyrations attract much of our detritus.
In this special issue we seek to both acknowledge the persistent resonance of the understanding of code as the language of machines^and to move beyond it. We therefore view code qua programs and algorithms as epitomizing a much broader contemporary phenomenon. Code is understood here not only in terms of software but also in terms of cultural, moral, ethical and legal codes of conduct. So many situations today become tractable and manageable (and also in-tractable and un-manageable) by virtue of their code-ability. Accordingly, the codes that we live, and we live by, reveal the ways in which the 'will to power' and 'will to knowledge' tend to be enacted in the contemporary world. Against this backdrop we can note a number of common themes which recur in discussions of codes and their crises. How codings render objects, events and relations into communicable signs, how in making them know-able and available they re-make them, and how such re-makings inevitability generate excess: these principal themes run through much contemporary work on code, coding and codeability. These can be summed up as the overlapping themes of signification/knowledge, performativity and excess. While all of these are important, it is perhaps performativity that plays out in crisis most, and in much of the discussion below it will be primary.
A General Theory of Code Decodes Itself 'Codification', argues Bateson (Bateson and Ruesch, 1951) , refers to the ways in which a universe of objects, relations and events is rendered into (communicable) symbols. Codes, in other words, (inter)mediate events and signs, worlds and cultures. In modernity (whether 'high', 'late' or 'post') 'code' has become the ubiquitous manifestation of the presumption that in principle all things are cognizable (Bryan, 2010) . Code thus prodigally (re)appears in various forms and guises. In various contemporary renderings of the world^as political system, as climatic system, as economic system, as media formation^code has come to be seen as the revelation of being. As Haraway (1991) has noted, contemporary forms of knowing, from computer and communication sciences to modern biology, involve a common move: the translation of the world into a problem of coding. Differences in kind^the language of life vs. the language of machinesb ecome differences in degree. Knowledge of the human and animal organisms has come to be seen as problems of genetic coding and read-out (1991: 164).
It is not our objective in this special issue to urge a 'general theory of code' . One problem which besets the quest for any such 'general theory' is that code names a range of seemingly diverse processes and objects. Thus in everyday language 'code' might equally refer to a written system of laws, to communication codes^from language to ciphers, to DNA 'instructions', to the written or unwritten rules of conduct pertaining to a wide range of social situations from 'codes of honour', to professional codes, to 'health and safety codes', to fashion codes, to etiquette. At the same time 'code' is more often identified with programming and software. This overarching identification of code with the language of machines might be understood as the heritage of post-Second World War cybernetic cultures. Throughout its various scientific incarnations^for instance in molecular biology, in climatology, or in the growth of various forms of systems thinking (operations research, artificial intelligence and machine learning, etc.)^the identification of code as program, as the execution of a sequence of pre-scripted operations, has been central (Beniger, 1997) . Similarly, as the notion of algorithm has been mathematically formalized in terms of computational costs, and algorithms intensively developed and catalogued in various domains (Cormen, 1990; Wirth, 1976) , the identification of code with program and algorithm has grown, sometimes at the expense of its other properties (to signify, for instance). Its other senses^as body of laws, as a collection of regulations on a subject, as a way of communicating, whether openly (Bernstein, 1973) or secretly (as in military codes and cyphers)ŝ till carry weight, but appear to have been overtaken and subsumed by the program and algorithms. This subsumption has been theoretically supported by various formalizations of code in information theory, in theoretical computer science and in algorithmic complexity theory (Fortnow and Homer, 2003) . Practically, it has been supported by the rampant growth of techniques and practices concerned with generating, writing, designing, propagating, circulating and commodifying code (for instance, the highly energized debates around open source software from the late 1990s onwards). The now apparently irreversible identification of code with program and program with algorithm is perhaps inevitable in a society that labels itself as an 'information' and a 'network' society (e.g. Castells; . This identification has gone hand-in-hand with an emphasis on the performativity of code, its apparent ability to 'make things happen' .
Code has become arguably as important as natural language because it causes things to happen, which requires that it be executed as commands the machine can run. Code that runs on a machine is performative in a much stronger sense than that attributed to language. (Hayles, 2005: 49^50) There has already been a protracted scholarly discussion of the performativity of code as software (Galloway, 2006; Hayles, 2005; . The growth in notions of code as performativity spans work on law (Lessig, 1999) , literature (Marino, 2006; Hayles, 2009) , art (Cox et al., 2002; Stocker and Sch˛pf, 2003; Cramer, 2002) , and the state (Levy, 2002) . Underlying much of this literature, two key issues are being debated: where code stands in relation to language and speech, and what norms govern the force of code. Whilst the entanglements of code and language are still being debated (for instance in critical code studies), execution is the distinguishing focus of much of this work. As Galloway (2004) puts it in his oftcited definition (e.g. Hayles, 2005) : 'code is the only language that is executable' . We can define such 'executability' as the ability 'to perform indicated tasks according to encoded instructions' (Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary). Thus, we might say that secret codes 'work' by (re-)distributing the ability to recover what has been encrypted in specific ways. Accordingly, one empirical question which inevitably shadows questions of code and coding is where does this execute-ability reside? (See for instance the articles by Chun and Harvey and Knox in this issue.) Any assertion of the distinctiveness of code execution would be open to deconstruction along the lines already drawn by Jacques Derrida in his reading of J.L. Austin's account of speech acts in 'Signature, Event, Context' (Derrida, 1982) , or by Judith Butler in her analysis of language, bodies and politics in Excitable Speech (Butler, 1997) . (It would also be possible to derive a similar line of argument out of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's discussion in Anti-Oedipus (1983) of the second desiring synthesis in desiring production, coding as recording). While our aim here is not to critique existing work on code (but see Introna, this issue), it is worth pointing out that both Derrida and Butler's account of performativity strongly suggest that any hard-and-fast opposition between language and force, between saying and doing, cannot be sustained. Therefore, any account of coding that starts or ends by opposing code to language, by separating meaning and force, or communicating and acting, is bound for trouble. The difficulty in opposing or even distinguishing language and code is that the iterability on which performativity relies^the repetition that allows it to become conventional^is itself coded. Something has to be ritualized in order for repetition to occur. Code works by being coded, and this code is encoded, that is, it is less than obvious or immediately legible. As Butler puts it, 'a performative ''works'' to the extent that it draws on and covers over the constitutive conventions by which it is mobilized ' (1997: 51) . Without the 'coding of code', code has no force and it does not 'execute' .
Hence, the conduct of code, we might say, its execution, is a fraught event, and analysis should be brought to bear on the conditions and practices that allow code to, as it were, access conduct. While the knowledge or form that lies at the heart of the code promises completeness and decidability, the execution of code is often mired in ambiguity, undecidability and incompleteness. This raises many concrete problems in relation to designing code-based interactions. At core, the problematic instability or slippage associated with code concerns the non-coincidence between knowing and doing (or conduct) represented by code. One series of questions here concerns how to understand this unstable non-coincidence. One way of highlighting the contingent association of code and conduct is via the concept of performativity. This performativity of code constantly enhances and widens the possibility of variations and deviations that are difficult to contain or control.
Code Worlds
To code desire^and the fear, the anguish of decoded flows^is the business of the socius. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 139) Perhaps in no other domain apart from computer software and hardware itself can such a profound re-mediation of both theory and practice be seen than in the re-conceptualization of the genetic elements of life as code-bearing molecules which began the 1950s with the work of Crick and Watson. The central dogma of molecular biology has become that DNA is the program or code for the construction of proteins that catalytically and structurally 'execute' life. As many scholars have observed, the thorough-going re-framing of biology over the last half-century in terms of code, program, information and communication has radically altered key understandings of reproduction, growth, evolution, and vitality (Virilio and Lotringer, 2002; Hayles, 1999) . The now very familiar process of putting code into life (and life into code) shows no signs of abating. In the wake of the much-discussed large-scale scientific projects to exhaustively list the Code of Life in the form of 'the' human genome, many further forms of codeability have been elaborated (see Moody, 2004 , Thacker, 2005 , for description of some of these). It has given rise to new sub-disciplines such as bioinformatics, specializing in the organization, integration and analysis of sequence data, as well as many instruments and data-processing arrangements practically constructed and managed as code objects. Yet contemporary high-throughput genomic sciences, coordinating thousands of machines, large databases and global consortia of institutions and infrastructures, doggedly pursue subtle and minute variations in sequence patterns in human and non-human genomes, all under the rubric of code. This ever-growing facility of codes to intermediate between different orders of being enables the ongoing transformation of their objects of knowledge. By means of such moves established categories of existence are seemingly dissolved and new ones willed into being. The natural and social worlds both become Heideggerian 'standing reserves' amenable to 'disassembly, reassembly, investment and exchange ' (Haraway, 1991) . Even where code is not the primary trope or technical term, other quasi-universals tend to reinforce its primacy. Code, whether in the guise of information technology, genomics or in some other form, commonly appears as the means through which any problem can be solved. We have seen that in the exuberance that greeted the arrival of the world-wide web in the late 1990s (Woolgar, 2002) , when commentators as far apart as Rupert Murdoch (1994), Bill Gates (1995) and Hardt and Negri (2004: 68^90) could join in the celebration of the internet as the engine of liberation and the empowerment of the multitudes.
Understood in these terms, codes increasingly appear as ways of worldmaking (Goodman, 1995) , as ways of positing and instrumenting distinctively (post?)modern worlds. Perhaps this is most 'literally true' in the apparently endless proliferation of intentionally immersive environments. Code-generated worlds, Baudrillardian copies without 'originals' which thus take the name of reality in vain, are often said to offer valid substitutes or alternatives to 'real life' ('RL') and to constitute valid ways of escaping its dangers and contingencies. Code here acts as a form of denial, escape, and fantasy (e.g. Rheingold, 2000) . You can fight a battle and walk away from it. New (real life and death) situations can be, and are, quite readily assimilated into these 'codeworlds' (e.g. Halter, 2006; Der Derian, 2009 ). Thus video games and interfaces which direct 'surgical strikes' in Iraq, Libya or Afghanistan bear more than a passing resemblance. As in the case of real versus simulated life, the boundaries between real and simulated death also become fuzzy.
Inevitably, anxieties and apprehension as well as great expectations come to cluster around codeworlds. Beck's (1992a Beck's ( , 1992b 'risk societies ' and Deleuze's (1995) 'societies of control' (figures of both lack and excess) in spite of their various differences represent pathologies of the codings to which the natural and social worlds are being subjected. 'Societies of control', it will be recalled, refer inter alia to what happens when populations meet code in the era of informational capitalism. 'Population' comes to be understood statistically as the set of entities whose properties or behaviours are observed (sampled) and estimated by various means, and whose dynamics are supported by the stochastic or chance processes generated by the combination of many events. In biological, geophysical, financial, military and media settings, code serves as a principal axis in the control of stochastic processes on large scales, distributed in various ways. Deleuze (1995) thus speaks of contemporary societies as disassembled and reassembled by means of 'numerical language[s] of control' . Code here becomes the concealed hand which directs participation, whether witting or unwitting, in the corporate marketplace^a theme explored in John Cheney-Lippold's contribution to this issue. Beck (1992a Beck ( , 1992b focuses on the in-ability of our techno-scientific systems to fulfill their promise of delivering us from risk and has highlighted their complicity in the production of widespread in-security. Indeed discussions of the nuclear (industry and weaponry) often name code 'itself' as a perilous excessive object. Nuclear codes appear plagued by millennial bugs (Knights et al., 2008) or as the merciless post-human guardians of the doctrine of Mutually Assured Discussion (MAD by design).
Similarly, Virilio expresses alarm at the notion of bodies, minds and behaviours made reducible to information codes (standing reserves) and subjected to computer-facilitated disassembly and recombination. For him, genetic engineering represents the culmination of the unfolding 'information revolution': the 'industrializing [of] the living organism itself' (Virilio and Lotringer, 2002: 103) . 'Evolution' in this sense no longer refers to natural but to an information selection from the databases that now constitute the human. We should therefore speak not of 'experiments on humans' but rather of 'human-experiments': the newly acquired 'freedom. . . to produce human beings, to create them, no longer to procreate them ' (2002: 117) . For Virilio, then, the new genomics transform biology into a teratology: it is no longer the sleep of reason that breeds monsters.
Whether codes work well or badly, it seems, their successes (Deleuze, Virilio) as well as failures (Beck) come at a price. Codeworlds it appears are haunted by spectres of crisis, as well as salvation, by anticipations of their own destruction. Code is the stuff nightmares, as well as dreams, are made of.
Crisis and their Codes: On Nuclear Codes and Critical Masses
The disruption, in the last instance, of the authority of the code as a finite system of rules; the radical destruction, by the same token, of every context as a protocol of a code. (Derrida, 1982: 316) Let us now begin to unravel a little what it means to know crisis through code through the case of the global nuclear assemblage. In the wake of a half-century of 'normal' accidents, nuclear weapons and nuclear energy have come to epitomize crisis-prone things. As the emblematic technologies of Beck's (1992a Beck's ( , 1992b 'risk society', they embody crisis in the sense that they call for decision and action split between starkly opposed alternatives: to have them or not to have them. Moreover, they carry within them the temporal-historical distension of crisis^they prolong the time of decision. The regular recurrence of 'nuclear crises'^Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, Iran, North Korea, Iran, Fukushima, to go nuclear or to dismantle itŝ eem to flow from something intrinsic to the nuclear devices (reactors, bombs) themselves. They are things made to be critical or dilemmatic. They materialize in crisis, and they have something critical in them in the form of 'critical mass': a flux of particle reactions whose balance must be constantly checked and regulated, so that it becomes neither inert fuel or explosive decay. In more philosophical terms, nuclear devices epitomize the crisis of scientific knowledge: the way in which formulae and code can substitute, as Edmund Husserl puts it in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, a 'mathematically substructed world of idealities for. . . our everyday life world' (Husserl, 1970: 49) .
'Code' is centrally implicated in the becoming of such intrinsically crisis-making substitutions of idealities into life worlds. Husserl highlighted this substitution in the 1930s at the same time as the mathematicians Alonzo Church and Alan Turing were, somewhat unwittingly, formalizing the foundations of a general architecture of substitution in their papers on decidability and computability (Church, 1936; Turing, 1936; Mackenzie, 1996) . Much of the violent history of computer code with its enduring debts to Second World War cryptography, ballistics, atomic weapons and military operations research follows in the wake of formalizations of computability found in Turing's and Church's work. The compressed criticality of nuclear weapons and devices relies on code. The techniques through which code permitted a technical knowledge of the 'critical' offers a useful allegory for the role of code in 'knowing' crises today. In the late 1940s, physicists at Los Alamos working on nuclear weapon design began to devise a new kind of computer simulation. Conjured up by Stanislaw Ulam in discussion with John von Neumann, so-called 'Monte Carlo simulations' allowed a certain class of difficult mathematical problems to be solved (Metropolis, 1949) . The problem was this: things in the world are, from the standpoint of 20th-century physics at least, largely engaged in mass random behaviour, and this randomness means that we can only view their collective behaviour in terms of statistical distributions. These distributions may have a complex shape since they reflect the collective behaviour of many different things. In nuclear physics, particles such as electrons, neutrons, protons and photons flux en masse. For weapons and reactor designers, the technical problem is to steer the overall flux of their interactions in the right direction^towards criticality, where the reactive flux is self-sustaining, perhaps explosively so. Any experimental determination of rates of flux in nuclear reactions is a highly risky undertaking since reactions in a given mass might become unexpectedly super-critical. (The Manhattan Project did have its 'criticality incidents' in 1945 when a mass of fissile material went supercritical. Many other critical incidents have occurred in reactors, including possibly and most recently the 'presence of transient criticalities' at Fukushima [Harrell, 2011] .) In nuclear reactors, it is sometimes difficult to know whether a critical incident has occurred (in nuclear weapons, of course, criticality is rather obvious). Faced with the enormous experimental risk of criticality, physicists could only make design decisions through calculation, verified for a decade or so through atomic tests. The problem with calculations of critical mass is they couldn't and still can't be carried out analytically. That is, the solutions to the equations describing the fluxes of fission reactions could only be approximated, not solved.
The only possible reckoning of criticality was by way of chance. Here computer code becomes crucial as a way of knowing what large numbers of things are doing. One of the things a computer could be used for was to generate large amounts of (pseudo-)random numbers. Large supplies of randomness are actually very useful since they can be used to stand in for large numbers of things in the world. If enough random numbers are generated by a computer, then the statistical distribution of those numbers can stand in for what happens in the world. If large numbers of numbers can stand in for large numbers of things, then the only question is how to shape the distribution of random numbers generated by the computer in such a way as to match the collective behaviour of the things in question. In nuclear weapons design, Monte Carlo simulations marshal large supplies of uniformly distributed random numbers to model 'infinite branching graphs' (Metropolis, 1949: 341) physically occurring as chain reactions, reactions whose chain embodies the relations and attributes posited by the equations of particle physics. In this setting, 'codes'^as the simulations were called^were crucial forms of dead reckoning, needed to navigate between sub-critical and critical states.
Code Makes an Infinite Branching Graph: Performativity Since code performativity results from coding, the question becomes: what specific norms or conventions does such execution pertain to? Starting out as a technique to aid nuclear weapon design, Monte Carlo simulations set off many 'chain reactions' in other domains and have thereby had a long half-life. Aside from deeply affecting supercomputer architectures from the 1960 to the 1980s (Mackenzie, 1991) , their branching graph of influence has continued to spread as they were applied in settings where chains of events occur. For instance, in recent years, they have become important in personal financial planning as well as modelling of the performance of financial derivatives. We could also track them through the design of materials such as spacecraft heatshields, in 'global illumination' software used to produce photo-realistic images in computer games and cinema, or in the ensemble models used by climatologists and meteorologists. They themselves have been covered over and recombined in subsequent codings, thereby percolating into an even wider variety of modelling and predictive applications: for instance, Bayesian computational statistics have begun to change how prediction and inference are managed in many empirical settings^spam detection, clinical trial design, DNA forensics, etc. In Bayesian statistics, Monte Carlo simulations are overlaid with processes of statistical inference. All of these cases are of lesser or greater interest to media studies, science studies, critical political economy, or sociology, but the key point is that the critical thing^the nuclear weapon, the rising mean global surface temperature, the personal pension plan, the unstably leveraged credit default swap^is not only known in code, but made in code. These codes are themselves the site of a constructive engagement with chance, with many rolls of the dice, with iterations whose chancy outcomes act as support functions for convergence on existing norms and divergence into new norms. The criticality of code comes from the infinite branching graph of decisions that code opens up and curtails.
Code as we most often talk about it today^something that forms a part of the technical infrastructures of the media, communication, control and production systems^is made to be in crisis, and crises are in code. The forms of code explored in this special issue are largely drawn in one way or another to code as software. In financial markets, in social media, or in visual media, crisis is inscribed in code. That is, the very structure of the code, its composition, its ordering, and its mode of existence are chronically crisis-affected. To identify any one particular aspect of code as the anchoring point of the crisis mode of temporality and duration would probably be to miss the processes of coding that buoy up code. The control structures, the dynamics of code revision, the restless expansion of code across various substrates, and the insatiable appetite for code execution as a way of detecting, predicting, connecting, assembling multiples together^these attributes of code have been fairly well analysed by now. However, perhaps what is still missing^and some of the papers to follow address this issuê are good accounts of the infinite branching graphs of decision that are lived through code.
Clearly, it would be a mistake to see code (merely) in terms of the reassertion of deterministic control over chance processes such as weather, disease and fashion. This engagement could be seen as taming chance, as an attempt to order and regulate events by laying down sequences of steps, by sorting and archiving events, attributes and operations so that the flow of things is more regular. Matters are definitely more complex than this. In a sense, code has become the source of new forms of chance. Rather than events simply becoming predictable through code, predictability itself has changed in important ways. Prediction has long been most closely associated with belief and with coded beliefs (such as religious texts and authorities). In the rise of statistical and empirical knowledges since the 18th century, prediction gradually adopted mathematical forms (Hacking, 1986 (Hacking, , 1975 Kruger et al., 1990; Knights and Vurdubakis, 1993) . In the 20th century, models and then simulations became the primary forms of predictive power, and such pre-dictive power allowed new things to come into the world, things whose very existence was predicated on coding prediction into models^nuclear weapons or global climate. Modernity, we might say, is coterminous with the demand for ever more efficacious instruments and technologies of anti-cipation (from the Latin ante ['before'] + capere ['take']). Without predictive models of chain reactions, nuclear weapons cannot be designed. Without predictive models of geophysical systems of energy circulation, global climate change cannot be predicted or indeed recognized (Edwards, 2010) . In both cases, the computer models or 'codes' (this term is specifically used to refer to simulation of energy transfer in nuclear reactions) make possible things whose effects cannot be easily predicted or controlled. Rather than successfully taming chance, or bringing events into order, code makes things less stable. It opens up worlds of uncertainty.
On Codes and Their Crises
There is a certain ambiguity which runs through contemporary conceptions of crisis and which is reflected in the entanglements of crisis narratives with the various forms of 'code' and 'coded' conduct. Our notions of what constitutes 'crisis', as cultural historians have shown, have undergone considerable inflation and no longer simply refer to the specific moments of judgement (from the Greek kr0sis/krisis) in tragedy and in medicine, moments where the fate of the hero or the patient is determined (Kosseleck, 2006) . Whether in media discourse or social scientific enquiry, 'crisis' has become, according to Luhmann (1984: 68) , a vehicle for contemporary society's self-understanding^'a semantic predisposition' always in search for new referential content. In the 'risk society', we might say, 'crisis' has been transformed from an event into a condition. At the same time the assumption persists that 'crises' represent failures of control demanding speedy resolution (Holton, 1987) . Against this backdrop, the generation of 'software solutions' as well as new 'codes of conduct have become an automatic response to the infinite branching graph of demands for new scientifically-validated forms of crisis resolution. 'Code' has thus come to echo this inflation of the 'crisis' metaphor: 'code' comprises one of the basic structures or infrastructures of 'crisis management' .
It is hardly surprising that code systems (software) and coded conducts figure prominently in the crisis narratives that pervade contemporary life. Climate change, epidemics, financial crises, terrorist threats, urban uprisings, as well as time, space, media and publics, all have in various ways mutually constitutive entanglements with code and coding processes. Sometimes codes regulate lives and events in the name of safety: passenger check-in and information systems, password and personal identification interfaces, biometric identification. Sometimes, events and situations seem to become manage-able or control-able by virtue of their code-ability. 'Code' is often assigned the role of bringing the nature, magnitude and ramifications of such crises into view (e.g. climatological models, epidemiological models, etc.), and thus subjecting them to disciplined knowing. For instance our knowledge of the causes, extent and consequences of global warming cannot be disentangled from the performance of the various climatological models and simulations which render it into a know-able object of study and policy. In turn, those models and simulations become key sites where such knowledge is contested (e.g. consider Michael Mann's 'hockey stick' graph or UEA's Climate Research Unit's 'Climategate' controversies; e.g. Russell, 2010; Booker, 2009; Gore, 1991; Black, 2011) .
Such debates and controversies have increasingly drawn popular attention to aspects of the performativity of code. In the case of the still unfolding financial crisis, for example, much opprobrium has been directed to the performances of particular algorithms and codings (see Mackenzie, 2011) . Indeed, the 'codes' and algorithms that have underpinned the techniques and practices of financial innovation of the last four decades are now widely blamed for both triggering and deepening the current financial crisis^and therefore as being ultimately responsible for the present economic instability. Contemporary practices of 'financial engineering'^per-haps best exemplified by Li's 'Gaussian copula' function widely used in the creation of Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs)^have arguably (e.g. Jones, 2009 ) set the stage for large-scale systemic breakdowns, 'normal accidents' in Perrow's (1985) sense. More broadly, financial markets and financial instruments are increasingly viewed as excessive, as bringing into being hyperreal, simulational worlds that come to destabilize and dominate the 'real-world' activities to which they ostensibly refer (e.g. Kroker and Kroker, 2008; Engelen et al., 2008) . The financial tail wags the economic dog. Codes and codings, to paraphrase Donald , increasingly come to be seen as the engines of financial and economic crises as well as a means for their resolution.
We can detect the mutually inflationary relationship of code-crisis at work in the perennial injunction which accompanies instances of 'crisis': 'we'/'they' (those whose job it is to make the world go round) should have pre-dicted such events and acted to bring them under control. '[H]ow do we thwart a terrorist who has not yet been identified?' asks Michael Chertoff (2006) , former US Secretary of Homeland Security:
we need to be better at connecting the dots of terrorist-related information. After Sept. 11, we used credit card and telephone records to identify those linked with the hi jackers. But wouldn't it be better to identify such connections before a hi jacker boards a plane? (emphasis added)
The solution to this problem, as Louise Amoore describes in her contribution to this issue, is sought in the development of new software tools and data analytics designed to extract pre-dictive patterns of relations from the apparently amorphous masses of 'data' thrown up by the digital technologies through which contemporary life is lived. She notes the telling resemblances of such acts of prediction to the logic of financial derivatives. Thus, while framed in terms of the ongoing 'War on Terror', Chertoff's questions nevertheless instantiate and articulate much broader demand for ever more effective instruments and architectures of anti-cipation: codings constitute attempts to ensure that not anything might happen.
'Limits to information ' (Brown and Duguid, 2000) and anticipation, whether attributable to the underdetermined nature of human action or the un-knowable contingencies of the future, are increasingly experienced as illegitimate barriers (tyche) destined to be overcome through improved algorithms and the dedicated application of technology. The desire and ability to sift through the massive amounts of transactional data generated by contemporary life, and to identify patterns of relations between seemingly unconnected data items, promises to transform what at first appears as little more than electronic noise into actionable knowledge (see Amoore, 2006; Andrejevic, 2010) . Interrogated by the new devices and techniques, note Achelp˛hler and Niehaus (2004: 407) , '[e] ven originally irrelevant data gains unexpected significance due to the possibilities of automatic data processing and its capacity of handling and connecting items. . . In this respect there is no ''insignificant'' data left in times of automatic data processing' .
A key feature of such computer-mediated acts of knowing is that they seek to solve problems of reference by increasingly 'eschewing the traditional quest for causality (depth), in favour of correlation and pattern recognition (surface)' (Knox et al., 2010) . For some, such developments point to a coming crisis of sociology (cf. Savage and Burrows, 2007) . As Anderson (2008) put it in his hyperbolic but nevertheless oft-quoted account, Google becomes the new paradigm of knowledge: massive amounts of data and applied mathematics [can] replace every other tool that might be brought to bear. Out with every theory of human behavior, from linguistics to sociology. Forget taxonomy, ontology, and psychology. Who knows why people do what they do? The point is they do it, and we can track and measure it with unprecedented fidelity. With enough data, the numbers speak for themselves.'
The triumph, then, of Searle's (1990) Chinese Room over alternative forms of knowing? Theory finally made redundant by code? Cheney-Lippold's contribution to this issue, for example, shows this mode of knowing in action. His focus is on the sophisticated algorithms that enable marketing and web analytics companies to sift through and categorize the masses of data routinely generated by people's on-line behaviour. Such devices allow companies to infer consumer identities and through them their bearers' future consumption activities.
The resemblances between Cheney-Lippold's consumer and Amoore's terrorist in the making are clearly not accidental. Thus, whilst security might be a domain where this newly automated labour of pattern recognition is most visibly performed, clearly similar processes are at work in all areas of modern life, from production, to consumption, to finance. Indeed (as Amoore indicates), the case of the latter is perhaps particularly instructive as a site where the complex techniques and models which underpin contemporary forms of anti-cipation were first widely deployed. Could it be that this new 'paradigm' of knowledge, while still in the process of colonizing other domains, is already in the throes of its own 'crises'?
As Mark Lenglet (this issue) shows, such 'crises' unfold in an increasingly 'posthuman' (Hayles, 1999) landscape. Financial markets are increasingly performed through the use of algorithms designed to speed up trading decisions and execution while at the same time concealing intentions and trading strategies. Ever since the October 1987 (Black Monday) stock market crash, computerized 'black box' trading has been accused of destabilizing the markets by increasing stock volatility. In the UK, for instance, the latest such claim has come from the former Financial Services Minister Lord Myners in the wake of the extreme volatility that has characterized the current phase of the financial crisis (e.g. Reuters, 14 Aug. 2011) . Be that as it may, it is clear that the speeding up of these processes to milliseconds means that their operation easily exceeds human supervision. As a result, such devices become the loci of tension and mutual interference between different codes: the trading algorithms encoded in the devices and the trading rules and codes of conduct operated by each market's regulatory overseers. Lenglet illustrates these tensions in his analysis of a London Stock Exchange (LSE) investigation triggered by the placing of a 'Large Erroneous Order' that caused a 'long' (13 second) spike in the price of the stock concerned^prior to the order being cancelled. The resulting (re)allocation of responsibilities for the error between human trader and algorithm is a reminder of how encodings typically entail negotiations over ontological categories.
Indeed, a common thread running through the articles that comprise this special issue is the concern with how codes and codings 'work' by endowing their objects with being: Cheney-Lippold's 'inferred' consumer, for instance; Amoore's 'yet to be terrorist' invisible in the electronic 'noise' of social life; Introna's plagiarist, hiding in the interstices of intertextual exchanges. As Introna (this issue) shows, plagiarism detection software such as Turnitin (another hybrid progeny of computer code and of social codes of conduct) does more than simply make instances of plagiarism 'known' and finger their authors. Rather than merely facilitating its discovery, such devices are constitutive of the phenomenon itself. They work to provide 'plagiarism' and its practitioners with a definitive ontological structure so that they can be rendered manage-able. There is nevertheless, Introna argues, a price to be paid for this convenience. Such seemingly straightforward procedures of identification also function as the means of foreclosing far more troublesome questions concerning language, encoding and the nature of 'originality' .
Questions of finitude and of the recognition (and de-recognition) of finitude constitute another common thread that connects a number of the articles in this collection. Penny Harvey and Hannah Knox, for example, discuss the ('health and safety') codes of conduct that aim to 'anticipate harm' during the road construction in the Andean Highlands. Despite the corporate motto of 'zero accidents', deaths occur. The social reactions that these deaths elicit show that the enactment of these codes, and of the modern(ist) ontologies which underpin them, remain persistently troubled by the spectre of their 'others' . That is to say by the co-presence of alternative ways of construing the world (and of what might or might not cause 'harm') that cannot be exorcised. They therefore illustrate the emergence of an ambivalent (from ambi ['both ways'] + valentia ['strength']) hybrid in which seemingly incompatible codings appear to (at least temporarily) inhabit, as well as destabilize, one another.
The two final papers in the collection explore finitude or limits interior to code. In both of their papers, as in their work more generally, Anna Munster and Wendy Hui Kyong Chun bring finitude and death in code to the foreground of the development of internet and new media. They take somewhat related paths in doing this. Drawing on Derrida and Butler, Chun's paper focuses on the temporality of crisis, and highlights a crisisprone temporality inherently associated with code-based media in general. This crisis plays out in several different registers: first, in relation to law and power, code brings with it the desire for perfect coincidence between law and action; second, in relation to memory, code promises fully predictable remembering. In both registers, phantasmatic sovereign subject formations can be found. Both aspects of code come together to induce formations of pleni-potent all-knowing subjectivity. The investment in 'source code'^the written text of software^in many political, commercial and epistemic contests over the last two decades can be understood in these terms as a somewhat retrospective attempt to compel coincidence between law and execution and to thereby short-circuit the undecidability of decision. Code, in consequence, goes deep into memory. To remember or not to remember, to save or not to save: these alternatives hardly seem the stuff of crises, yet as Chun argues, the impossibility of deciding whether to remember or not is intensified by code. In keeping everything, as we know, much is lost. Memory is commemorative; it requires regeneration and regeneration is always beset by problems of finitude. The 'finitude' of code stems from the fact that it can only resource memory, even the memory of real-time media (the media of contemporary crises) by running or execution. The execution of code supports both the originary sovereign subject whose action is law and the subject beset by the need to re-process, to re-iterate, to run again, in order to remember. In this impossible situation, crisis after crisis arises. The question then is how to respond to the exhausting yet compulsive momentum of this trajectory.
One answer to this question, at least in the context of the contemporary network media, comes from an analysis of disconnection or what might be called 'digital death' . Munster's paper analyses a mood of finitude marking a shift from the internet of the 1990s to contemporary social network media, computer games and military training simulations. In this shift, an ebullient positivity animated by code's capacity to assemble relations or created lifted-out spaces becomes a sober awareness or sometimes preoccupation with irreversible digital death. Like the exhaustion that Chun describes, the ethos of digital death suggests that the generative possibilities of code, whilst increasingly felt to be somewhat suffocating or overwhelming, are open to productive differentiations. The implications of her analysis are wide. Whilst affirming the differentiating power of code, Munster outlines the way in which a certain will-to-life has accompanied the growth of digital code more generally. Code's will-to-life^evident in genomics, and artificial life, to give two examples^complicates any simple affirmation of code, since it feeds directly into biopolitical and post-biopolitical power relations. What is hard, then, is the task of wresting something away from code, of finding uncoded spaces or locating bifurcations within code itself that resist immediate recuperation by anticipatory cognitive captures. Such birfurcations, if they exist, will be transient segmentations of social network media's biopolitical massification.
When Reinhardt Koselleck writes that 'the concept of crisis, which once had the power to pose unavoidable, harsh and non-negotiable alternatives, has been transformed to fit the uncertainties of whatever might be favored at a given moment' (Koselleck, 2006: 306) , he might have been referring to the percolation of code through the interstices of all alternatives. The themes of code as signification/knowledge, performativity and excess unfold in the chiasmus of code and crisis. The account of code in crisis and crisis in code we have been sketching here seeks to track down how code and crisis define and feed one another. Knowing, performing and excess (the overflows of performativity) constantly flow into each other in crisis. The processes of coding and forms of criticality we have described are reciprocally driven by these flows. From time to time, in halting steps or massive slippages, bifurcations that are not just part of the 'infinite branching graph' of performativity harshly and non-negotiably split things open. These events, on whatever scale, can expose something against which coding of criticality shatters. If code and crisis are made for and in each other, then work on such bifurcations is vital.
